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Can extreme rainfall trigger democratic change?  
The role of flood-induced corruption 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a new dataset of extreme rainfall covering 130 countries from 1979 to 2009, this 
paper investigates whether and how extreme rainfall-driven flooding affects democratic 
conditions. Our key finding is that extreme rainfall-induced flooding exerts two opposing 
effects on democracy. On one hand, flooding leads to corruption in the chains of emergency 
relief distribution and other post-disaster assistance, which in turn impels the citizenry to 
demand more democracy. On the other hand, flooding induces autocratic tendencies in 
incumbent regimes because efficient post-disaster management with no dissent, chaos or 
plunder might require government to undertake repressive actions. The net estimated effect 
is an improvement in democratic conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A growing body of research highlights the crucial role played by environmental conditions in 
shaping the economic and political landscapes of nations (see Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 
2004; Brückner and Ciccone 2011; Cole, Healy and Werker 2012; Nunn and Puga 2012; Dell, 
Jones and Olken 2014; Wood and Wright 2015). In this vein, rainfall shocks (i.e., droughts) have 
received considerable scholarly attention as a source of exogenous variation leading to significant 
changes in economic and political outcomes.  
However, the extant literature tells us rather little about extreme rainfall, either as a relevant 
environmental concept or as an instigator of potentially dramatic changes in economic and 
democratic conditions. This study departs from the previous literature by focusing on the effects 
of extreme rainfall—the polar opposite of drought—on democracy. In particular, we examine a 
key mechanism through which extreme rainfall-driven flooding might affect democratic 
conditions: corruption. The primary reason to explore this transmission channel is that the potential 
consequences of extreme rainfall-driven flooding, such as widespread corruption in the 
distribution of relief actions following such flooding, can induce adverse public reactions against 
the incumbent government, which may lead to political regime changes. 
Extreme rainfall merits scholarly attention for several reasons. First, some climatologists 
think that global warming is likely to increase the frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall 
incidents by the end of the 21st century. It has been predicted that a 1-in-20 years annual maximum 
daily precipitation is likely to become an event occurring 1-in-5 to 1-in-15 years by the end of the 
21st century, particularly for high latitudes and tropical regions, and for the northern mid-latitude 
regions during winter (see Field 2012). Moreover, catastrophic flooding triggered by extreme 
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rainfall not only claims thousands of lives but also destroys significant capital stocks and outputs. 
Over the 1979–2009 period, floods alone annually affected an average of over 122 million people 
globally (see CRED 2011). 
Flooding victims may have strong reactions to ineffectiveness or corruption at the 
governmental level in emergency responses to flooding (see Leeson and Sobel 2011; Chang and 
Berdiev 2015). Natural disasters typically create windfalls in the form of aid and relief, which can 
boost fraudulent appropriation and theft (see Leeson and Sobel 2007; 2011; Yamamura 2014). As 
citizens’ livelihoods already are in jeopardy owing to the disaster, such expropriation by public 
officials may lead citizens to revolt and remove the incumbent from power. This proposition is 
consistent with the so-called democratic efficiency theory and has received empirical support from 
Leeson and Sobel (2011) in the case of mayoral elections in New Orleans following 2005 
Hurricane Katrina.1 Akarca and Tansel (2016) provide more recent evidence, albeit for a different 
type of natural disaster, earthquakes. In examining the aftermath of the devastating 1999 
earthquake in Turkey, Akarca and Tansel find that the Turkish electorate thereafter held 
accountable not only the dominant ruling party at the time of the earthquake but also other parties 
that were in power when the earthquake-vulnerable buildings were built.2 The associated public 
outcry resulted in the 2002 electoral ouster of all three parties of the incumbent governing coalition. 
However, in spite of these case studies strongly linking disaster-driven corruption and electoral 
outcomes to the demand for public reform, the literature is ambiguous regarding the precise 
mechanisms through which such corruption ultimately affects democratic conditions.  
                                                 
1 An earlier evidence on the public reaction against corruption is provided by Peters and Welch (1980), who show 
that corruption charges against candidates reduce the votes these candidates receive in US congressional elections by 
6% to 11%. See also and Welch and Hibbing (1997). 
2 Escaleras, Anbarci and Register (2007) show that in countries with more corruption, earthquakes are more deadly. 
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An entirely different political impact of flooding on democracy is a direct effect in which 
floods prompt repression from the political regime owing to the chaos that often ensues following 
flooding events (Cole et al. 2012; Wood and Wright 2015). Such a direct effect may arise, 
independent of any other channel, when violence, dissent, and plunder occur in the post-flooding 
aftermath and leads to repressive responses by the incumbent regime (Davenport 2007, Wood and 
Wright 2015). Notably, the repressive reaction may be provoked because an authoritative form of 
governance might be understood as more efficient at relief distribution.3,4  
Our empirical analysis documents that extreme rainfall-triggered flooding exerts two 
opposing effects on democratic conditions. On one hand, floods produce corruption in the 
distribution of relief, which, in turn, leads to more democracy. On the other hand, extreme rainfall-
driven floods reinforce authoritarian tendencies in the incumbent political regime. Taken together, 
we find that the net effect of extreme rainfall-driven floods on political change is more democracy. 
Another key finding relates to the temporal effect of corruption on democracy: we show that flood-
induced corruption in a given year has a significant positive impact on democracy over the next 
three years but that it disappears after the fourth year. 
Next, we shed light on our key empirical result regarding the relationship between flood-
induced corruption and more democracy with a simple dynamic game-theoretic model. Played 
between the government and the voters in three stages, the model illuminates the dynamics 
between the government’s choices in tackling corruption during emergency response and voters’ 
                                                 
3 On a related, but nevertheless distinct topic, Sobel and Leeson (2006), Schultz and Libman (2015) and Escaleras 
and Register (2012) show how decentralized political institutions and local knowledge contribute to government 
effectiveness in responding to natural disasters. 
4 A well-known historical example the severe 1970 flooding in Eastern Pakistan, which acted as a catalyst for 
Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971. 
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subsequent reaction to the government’s choice in a forthcoming election. In the first stage, the 
government decides whether or not to provide costly action to prevent corruption in relief 
distribution following a disaster. After observing the government’s choice, in the second stage, 
voters decide whether to keep the government in office or oust it from power. If the government 
remains in power, in the third stage, it decides whether to be autocratic or democratic, where being 
democratic is more costly than being autocratic. The equilibrium of this game is such that the 
government would choose to be democratic at the end because insurgency by the public when a 
government is both corrupt and autocratic following a disaster is very costly and difficult to 
neutralize.  
The innovative feature of this model is its heuristic observation that a regime is unlikely to 
pursue a response trajectory that involves either double negatives (i.e., not preventing corruption 
and becoming autocratic) or a zero-negative (i.e., preventing corruption and becoming democratic) 
following a disaster. The more likely response involves only one negative in which the negative is 
associated with less cost to the government. Given our payoff structure, this response is “not 
prevent corruption but offer more democracy following the disaster.” Several anecdotes around 
the world are consistent with similar games and outcomes, as explained in section 6.  
Overall, this study traces two different components of political change following flooding 
events: a direct effect leading to an increased autocratic tendency, which we interpret to be due to 
the repressive stance of the incumbent to avert any plunder and/or to ensure efficient relief 
distribution, and an indirect effect resulting from increased corruption that eventually leads to more 
democracy as a result. Critically, our estimates show that the indirect effect (corruption-induced 
democracy) empirically dominates the direct effect. One explanation for this finding might be that 
6 
 
 
 
citizens are willing to tolerate some repression in the aftermath of a flooding event because an 
authoritative government might be better at efficiently distributing relief and/or suppressing a 
violent minority that might endanger property rights in the midst of post-disaster chaotic 
environments. By contrast, fewer citizens tolerate corruption in the distribution of relief during 
periods of plight and grievance. The much larger proportion of citizens that is likely to become 
dissatisfied (and possibly insurgent) as a result of corruption in relief distribution might be driving 
the dominant effect of democratic improvement over repression. 
2. Hypotheses on Extreme Rainfall, Flooding, and Democracy 
2.1. Indirect Effect: Extreme Rainfall–Democracy Nexus through Corruption 
The literature on the link between floods and corruption is rather scant. However, in a more 
general context, Leeson and Sobel (2008) note that the spatial map of natural disasters matches the 
geographical map of corruption in the US. In this body of research, at least three reasons can be 
identified for corruption following natural disasters. First, natural disasters generate resource 
windfalls in affected regions as a result of the influx of national emergency relief, and such 
resource windfalls might facilitate fraudulent misappropriation. Second, during post-disaster 
construction, the government itself may fraudulently award hefty contracts to lobbying firms in 
exchange for their support in future elections. Third, Hunt (2007) argues that the victims of 
catastrophic events are much more likely to bribe government officials than non-victims because 
victims are more likely to be desperate and vulnerable and to require public services immediately. 
Thus, the implication is that flooding can create a chaotic atmosphere that might in turn increase 
public officials’ scope and likelihood of engaging in corruption.  
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However, the effects of flood-induced corruption on political conditions are ambiguous 
and may extend in both directions. On one hand, citizens may expect their flood-induced shortfall 
in income to be compensated—at least in part—by governmental relief. The shortfall or absence 
of such compensation due to corruption may lead to strong demands for public reform. In settings 
characterized by elections, such public outcry may also result in the weakening of the current 
government or even its ouster from power. Flood-induced income shortfalls may even lead citizens 
to contest the incumbent government by demonstrating because lower incomes reduce the 
opportunity costs involved with such challenges. This argument is consistent with the political 
transitions theory developed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). All these results may ultimately 
incentivize the government to become more democratic to counter-balance the dissent. On the 
other hand, flood-induced corruption might deteriorate democratic conditions. For example, 
corruption might reduce citizens’ trust in the incumbent, leading them to opt for military rule or to 
elect populist-but-heavy-handed rulers, such as the late Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (see Seligson 
2006). In addition, autocratic leaders may use the appropriated disaster aid to support their own 
power base and to augment their authority (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). It is widely 
documented that the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers competed over humanitarian 
aid following the 2004 tsunami. The Sri Lankan military used the hefty aid to weaken the Tamil 
Tigers and to end the multi-decade insurgency in 2009 (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009; Wood and 
Wright 2015). This outcome paved the way for a heavy-handed populist regime in the country. 
Thus, it is not immediately obvious how flood-induced corruption affects democracy. These 
arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Extreme rainfall-driven floods are likely to increase the scope and likelihood 
of corruption. The manner in which the resulting corruption affects the political regime is 
ambiguous. 
2.2 Direct Effect: Extreme Rainfall, Floods and Democracy 
The second source of political change following extreme rainfall-driven flooding consists 
of direct effects, i.e., the effects on political regimes that are independent of any specific channel. 
Several studies have both argued and provided evidence for the proposition that governments are 
likely to engage in repressive behavior following natural disasters. Such repression may seem 
optimal for several reasons. For example, incumbents can implement rapid and efficient relief 
distribution more easily under an autocratic than under a democratic form of governance because 
they need not consult legislative, judicial, and other organs in executing their disaster agenda. 
Governmental repression may also be provoked by large-scale violence, dissent, and political 
unrest that challenges the incumbent government, the existing balance of power and regime 
stability in the country (Wood and Wright 2015). In addition, severe disasters may constrain the 
state’s capacity to deliver essential services such as power, water, public transportation and public 
health, aggravating the cognitive shock that citizens have already experienced as a result of the 
catastrophe. Moreover, in countries with weak protection of property and human rights, plunder 
and even murder may follow in the wake of the natural disaster. Finally, the exogenous shock to 
the economic and political system may exacerbate already unequal resource distribution, deepen 
ethnic cleavages, escalate political tensions, and provide opportunities to question the legitimacy 
and power of the state (Davenport 2007; Wood and Wright 2015). All these factors may induce 
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strong nondemocratic and authoritarian reactions by the political regime. These arguments lead to 
our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Extreme rainfall-driven floods can provoke autocratic tendencies in political 
regimes independent of any channel because of the repression induced by violence, dissent and 
plunder following the natural disaster. 
3. Data and Measurement 
Each year, approximately 96,000 cubic kilometers of precipitation fall on the land surface of Earth, 
of which approximately 60,000 cubic kilometers are absorbed by human structures or infiltrated 
into the land, and the remaining 36,000 run off into oceans (see Huffman 2013).5 
Rainfall is classified as “heavy” if precipitation is falling at rates greater than 7.5 mm (0.30 
in) per hour.6 Falling from clouds that are typically 2–7 km above the Earth’s surface, heavy 
rainfall droplets range up to approximately 3 mm (0.13 in) in diameter, with a rate of fall of up to 
7.6 m (25 ft) per second, depending on the size of the droplets. Raindrops typically range in number 
from 100–1,000 per cubic meter (3–30 per cubic foot). In general, a “heavy” raindrop may fall to 
Earth at a speed of up to 32 km (20 mi) per hour.  
When the duration and intensity of the rainfall exceed the soil’s ability to absorb the rain, 
excess water begins to run off. The average depth of runoff around the globe is approximately 27 
cm, but there is considerable variation from this average, depending on the location. Annual runoff 
                                                 
5 Each year, approximately 320,000 cubic kilometers of water evaporates from the oceans and 60,000 cubic kilometers 
evaporates from lakes, lagoons and streams. Of the total of 380,000 cubic kilometers of evaporation, approximately 
284,000 cubic kilometers falls back into the world’s oceans as precipitation and 96,000 onto the land surface, creating 
the hydrological cycle. 
6 Cherrapunji in northeast India experiences the world's heaviest rainfall of up to approximately 10,922 mm (430 in) 
per year. In the U.S., the heaviest rainfall amounts—up to 1778 mm (70 in)—are experienced in the southeast, 
followed by moderate annual accumulations, from 762–1270 mm (30–50 in), in the eastern U.S., and smaller 
accumulations, 381–1016 mm (15–40 in), in the central plains.  
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of over 100 cm occurs primarily in the tropics (i.e., in the tropical areas of Central America, the 
lower Amazon basin, equatorial West Africa, and Bangladesh and northeast India,) and in coastal 
alpine settings (i.e., in coastal Alaska and British Columbia, Norway, Chile and Argentina, 
Tasmania, and New Zealand). Each of these belts of exceptionally heavy runoff is surrounded by 
areas that receive approximately 50–100 cm of runoff annually. The areas producing less than 10 
cm of runoff per year are extensive. The largest such contiguous area covers the north of Africa, 
the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and much of interior Asia. The interior of 
North America west of the 100th meridian and the Atacama and Patagonia in South America also 
produce little runoff. 
In many cases, extreme rain-driven runoff is sufficient to swamp cities with weak 
infrastructure. For example, in July 2005, when Mumbai (India) received 94 cm of rain in one 24-
hour span, flash flooding was triggered and claimed approximately 1,200 lives. As a result, over 
20 million people were affected in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Goa, Orissa, 
Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir (CRED 2011).  
3.1. Data on Extreme Rainfall 
Variations in extreme rainfall (i.e., variations in the higher end of the distribution of the rainfall 
volumes) constitute an exogenous source of change in terms of flooding severity.7 We use NASA’s 
GPCP database of monthly rainfall estimates for 130 countries over the 1979–2009 period to trace 
extreme rainfall occurrence. The GPCP database is the only database of its type that relies on both 
rain gauge and satellite data, as adjusted for systematic errors in rain gauge measurements.8 
                                                 
7  The contemporary hydrology literature demonstrates the relationship between runoff and flood severity. See Sui 
and Koehler (2001) and Cunderlik and Burn (2002). 
8 The correlation between our measure and alternative data sources such as the National Center for Environment 
Prediction and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization agro-climatic database is over 0.8.  
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3.2. Measuring Extreme Rainfall  
Our extreme rainfall measure aims at capturing rainfall variations at the higher end of the 
rainfall volume distribution. The measure is based on monthly rainfall estimates over the 1979–
2009 period observed at a 2.5°×2.5° latitude-longitude interval across 2,321 nodes in 130 countries 
(see Appendix A1 for a list of total number of nodes in each country).9 
Given the monthly total rainfall volumes for each node, we first estimate the 90th percentile 
of monthly total rainfall during the 1979–2009 period for that node.10 This estimate produces the 
threshold to identify the cut-off point for the monthly extreme rainfall that has occurred over the 
last 30 years. If the actual total rainfall in one month exceeds this threshold level, it is considered 
extreme rainfall at the nodal level. Finally, we sum all the extreme rainfall estimates in a given 
year for all the nodes within a country’s boundary. Thus, the yearly extreme rainfall is calculated 
as follows: 𝑅௜,௧௘௫௧௥௘௠௘ = ∑ ∑ ൫𝑅௜,௣,௠,௧௧௢௧௔௟ − 𝑅௜,௣,௧
௧௢௧௔௟ ௔௧ ଽ଴௧௛ ௣௘௥௖௘௡௧௜௟௘൯ଵଶ೛௠ୀଵ
௉
௣ୀଵ , where R stands for rainfall, 
i represents the country, p indicates spatial nodes, m represents the month, and t denotes the year. 
In other words, our extreme rainfall metric takes the positive difference between the actual volume 
of total monthly rainfall in a given year and the 90th percentile of the average monthly total rainfall 
observed in the past 30 years for each nodal point on Earth. If the difference is negative, we set 
that value equal to zero, indicating the absence of extreme rainfall. 
Our measure of extreme rainfall is likely to measure weather shocks. First, it captures 
extreme rainfall even when it occurs in an area in which rainfall is rare in retrospect.11 Thus, Figure 
                                                 
9 Adopting the standard deviation of monthly total rainfall in a given year for each 2.5° node to measure extreme 
rainfall yields qualitatively similar findings.  
10 Our results remain qualitatively similar using the 95th, 85th, 80th, and 75th percentile thresholds. 
11 For example, Makkah Province in Saudi Arabia faces severe seasonal flash floods notwithstanding that it is situated 
in an arid area characterized by high temperatures and low rainfall.  
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1 shows that country A has seven nodal points (i.e., A1–A7) and four high rainfall-prone zones 
(i.e., A3–A6) throughout the year, whereas country B has eight nodal points (i.e., B1–B8) and 
none that have experienced high levels of rainfall historically. Thus, it might be tempting to 
conclude that country A would be more extreme rainfall-prone than country B. However, the 
extreme rainfall threshold in our measure is much higher for rainfall-prone zones than the threshold 
level for rare-rainfall zones.12 Second, our model traces out extreme rainfall on a monthly basis, 
accounting for seasonal variation at each node. Third, the 90th percentile threshold is applied to 
monthly average rainfall over the last 30 years, which captures the climatic conditions and leaves 
only the extreme weather shocks to examine. 
3.3. Data on Flood Severity 
We use the EM-DAT dataset of flood incidents (see, for instance, Kahn 2005; Keefer, Neumayer 
and Plümper 2011). The EM-DAT dataset is updated when a flood incident satisfies any of the 
following four criteria: (1) 10 or more people are reported killed; (2) 100 or more people are 
reported affected; (3) there is a call for international assistance; or (4) there is a declaration of a 
state of emergency. EM-DAT provides data on the total number of people who have died, are 
injured, made homeless or are otherwise affected. To measure flood severity, we add up the 
numbers of injured, homeless, and affected people. In the event that flooding occurs more than 
once in a given year, the annual total of the number of affected is used (see Keefer, Neumayer and 
Plümper 2011). 
We are aware that extreme rainfall is generally a localized event, although its resultant 
outcomes—e.g., flooding—may not be always localized. However, the extent of flooding is 
                                                 
12 The exclusion of smaller countries, such as country C in Figure 3, is unlikely to affect our results, as we employ a 
large panel of 130 countries and capture extreme rainfall variations on a small-scale interval, i.e., 2.5°×2.5°. 
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primarily a result of extreme rainfall in river basins that may be far upstream. Provided that the 
river basins are generally not small—as none in Asia and Africa are, in particular—we identify 
extreme rainfall at 2.5°×2.5° interval and then add up all such localized extreme rainfalls that 
occurred in a given year at the country level. Then, we sum all flood intensities—e.g., the number 
of people affected by flooding—within a country for the same year. This approach relates both 
localized flashfloods (i.e., floods resulting from extreme rainfall in the same locality) and riverine 
flooding (i.e., floods caused by extreme rainfall in a different locality) with our measure of extreme 
rainfall at the country level. 
We measure democracy with the Polity2 measure from the Polity IV project (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2005). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this paper. 
The definitions and sources of all the variables are provided in Appendices A2 and A3. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Single-Equation Estimation 
We begin with a standard single-equation specification in which we model the effects of extreme 
rainfall intensity on the Polity2 measure of democracy: 
     𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2௜,௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛௜,௧ + 𝜐௜,௧ 
where i stands for country and t for time, (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛) is the log of extreme rainfall 
measure and Polity2 is the democracy score. Country fixed effects, country-specific time trends, 
and common time effects are all controlled for in the model. 
This model estimates the total net effect of extreme rainfall intensity on democracy. 
Column 1 in Table 2 reports no significant relationship in this vein. Several potential explanations 
follow. First, there simply may be no nexus between extreme rainfall and democracy. Second, the 
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model might suffer as a result of omitted variables (e.g., extreme rainfall might have different 
effects in low- vs. high-income regimes). Third, extreme rainfall may affect democracy through 
mediating factors such as the number of people affected, or it may exhibit both direct effect and 
indirect effects. Further, the direct and indirect effects may differ in sign and make the total net 
effect ambiguous.  
To investigate these effects, we first include income per capita and its quadratic in the 
model, which does not have any effect on the impact of extreme rainfall (columns 2 and 3). Next, 
we regress 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 on democracy (column 4), and the OLS estimate is insignificant. To address 
possible endogeneity in this model, we next estimate the effect of flooding on democracy by using 
extreme rainfall as an instrumental variable in a limited information maximum likelihood 
estimation. The critical assumption here is that rainfall shocks affect democracy only by means of 
flooding. The top panel in columns 5 to 7 reports the second-stage estimates of the effects of the 
number of flood-affected people on democracy, whereas the bottom panel presents the first-stage 
effects of extreme rainfall on the number of people affected. Panel B in column 5 indicates that 
extreme rainfall is significantly linked to the number of people affected at the 5% level. However, 
such human casualties are not strong enough to affect democracy, see Panel A. Including income 
per capita and its quadratic in the model in columns 6 and 7, respectively, does not affect the 
results. 
We next consider the corruption channel. However, estimating the indirect effects of 
flooding on democracy through corruption using a single equation model is implausibly 
complicated if not impossible. What is more feasible is to estimate the effects of flooding on 
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corruption itself. Columns 8 to 10 show that extreme rainfall-driven flooding is insignificantly 
related to corruption in a single equation context.  
4.2. The System of Equations Estimation 
To track the relationship between extreme rainfall and democratic conditions via the corruption 
channel, we formulate a following type system of simultaneous equations: 
(I)    𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑௜,௧ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦௜,௧ଶ + 𝜀௜,௧ 
(II)   𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡௜,௧ =  𝛾଴ + 𝛾ଵ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑௜,௧ + 𝛾ଶ𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑌௜,௧ + 𝜗௜,௧ 
(III)   𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2௜,௧ = 𝜆଴ +  𝜆ଵ𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡௜,௧+ 𝜆ଶ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑௜,௧+ 𝜆ଷ𝑁𝑃௜,௧ + 𝜐௜,௧ 
where Corrupt is corruption, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 is the total number of people affected by floods normalized 
by population in country i at time t, (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛 ) is the measure of extreme rainfall, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 
denotes real GDP per capita, and (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2) is the measure of democracy. Country-specific 
heterogeneity, country-specific time trends, and year-fixed effects are controlled for in all three 
equations. Notably, Corrupt measures the overall corruption in a country and not the component 
that is induced by flooding. However, with country-specific time trends controlled for in the model, 
𝛾ଵ would pick up the component of corruption that diverges from the general corruption trend 
following flooding events.  
Equation I of the system captures the effects of extreme rainfall on flood severity, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑. 
Linear and quadratic forms of income (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦ଶ) are included in Equation I to control for 
the effects of the level of economic development or urbanization on flood intensity. The impact of 
floods largely depends on disaster preparedness levels and risk mitigation plans, and income can 
act as a reasonable proxy for both (see Noy 2009). (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑛 ) is the distinct exogenous 
variable in Equation I that is required for system identification. 
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Equation II of the system captures the effects of 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 on Corrupt. Hypothesis 1 posits 
that flooding is likely to increase the scope and likelihood of corruption. The average income of 
neighboring countries (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑌) acts as the distinct exogenous variable required for system 
identification (see section 4.3 for the relevance and exogeneity of this variable).  
In Equation III, Corrupt captures the indirect effects of extreme rainfall-driven floods on 
democracy. Hypothesis 1 posits that the impact of flood-induced corruption on democracy is 
ambiguous. This equation also estimates the impact of 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 on 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2. Here, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 represents 
the direct effects of the number of flood-affected citizens on democracy. In other words, it captures 
any effect of floods on democracy other than corruption. In our setting, this effect is likely to 
measure the repressive response of the incumbent regime following flood incidents. The average 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score of neighboring countries (𝑁𝑃) is the distinct exogenous variable for system 
identification; for more on this variable, see below. 
4.3 System Identification 
The principal advantage of the system estimation is that it can capture both the direct and indirect 
effects of flooding on democracy. However, a typical criticism leveled against this method is that 
a misspecification can traverse through the equations, biasing the estimation. Our restrictive 
specification, which controls for country-specific heterogeneity, country-specific time trends, and 
year-specific effects, is expected to mitigate such drawbacks. Thus, we estimate our system using 
three-stage least squares (3SLS).  
We next turn to identifying the system. Our key assumption in Equation I is that extreme 
rainfall affects corruption and Polity2 only by means of flooding severity (i.e., the total number of 
people affected) and not through other mechanisms. One possibility violating this exclusion 
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restriction is that extreme rainfall might not only strike the population but also destroy physical 
capital, which is likely to have an independent effect on output and Polity2. In an unreported 
exercise, we estimated the impact of extreme rainfall on gross capital formation but we did not 
observe a statistically significant relationship. Although this finding should not immediately 
discard the role of investment in the post-disaster phase, it is comforting for identification of our 
system that is based on annual panel data. Nonetheless, this restriction may be violated over the 
longer term.  
A broad strand of the literature suggests that countries with open, large, and more 
developed neighboring economies experience faster growth than those with closed, smaller, and 
less-developed neighbors (See Ades and Chua 1997; Conley and Ligon 2002). Our assumption is 
that the average income of neighboring countries (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑌) can also co-vary with the domestic 
country’s level of corruption. A richer neighbor might facilitate market competition and help new 
private and government agents enter into markets such that there is more competition among public 
and private agents. Such increased competition among rent-seeking bureaucrats can reduce 
corruption (see Ades and Di Tella, 1999; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Richer and politically 
powerful neighbors might also push their neighbors to adopt more open and transparent policies. 
The fact that minimizing corruption is one of the accession conditions into the European Union 
for Central and Eastern European countries epitomizes this point. 
Finally, the relevance of the weighted average 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score of neighboring countries 
(𝑁𝑃) for 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 in Equation III is well established under the democratic domino theory.13 For 
example, countries may compete for democratization to obtain international trade privileges and 
                                                 
13 See Starr 1991; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Leeson and Dean 2009.  
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to attract foreign direct investment, or the diffusion effect may ignite democratization in 
neighboring countries as a result of social movements. In section 5.3, we undertake several 
robustness tests to examine the reliability of the neighbor-weighted variables. 
Other threats to identification are likely to arise from permanent differences in country 
characteristics, common shocks across countries, and long-term trends in variables. We jointly 
control for country-specific fixed effects, country-specific time trends and common time effects in 
all the equations. Such a restrictive specification is likely to eliminate any spurious effects. 
Nonetheless, our empirical analysis assumes a careful approach by adding those characteristics to 
the system in stages to illuminate their role.  
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Extreme Rainfall-Driven Floods and Democracy 
Model 3.1 presents the estimates for our system of simultaneous equations outlined in Equations 
I-III but with no fixed effects. Model 3.2 adds country fixed effects, whereas Model 3.3 is the most 
comprehensive specification that accounts also for country-specific time trends and common time 
effects. Standard errors, which are robust to any form of heteroscedasticity, are clustered at the 
country level. 
Column 1 of Model 3.1 indicates that there is no statistically significant link between 
extreme rainfall and flood severity, which may result because countries with heterogeneous 
extreme rainfall intensities are likely to be better prepared for flooding, such as by having 
previously built structures (e.g., dams, water gates and barriers) that regulate water levels. Failing 
to control for these differences would lead the effects of extreme rainfall on flood severity to be 
biased downward, and as in our case, to possibly switch signs.  
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Not surprisingly, accounting for permanent country characteristics in Model 3.2 has a 
dramatic impact on the effects of extreme rainfall in Equation I, leading its sign not only to switch 
to positive but also to become statistically significant at the 5% level. In particular, column 4 
indicates that a 10% increase in the volume of extreme rainfall increases the number of affected 
persons by one person per 100 people. Equation II in Model 3.2 indicates that rainfall-driven floods 
have significant effects on democracy (column 5). One in every 100 people affected by floods 
increases the PRS measure of corruption by 0.185 points on a scale of 0 to 6 (where higher scores 
denote more corruption).14 Moreover, Equation III estimates that increased corruption is associated 
with a higher 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score of 0.56 points (0.185 × 3.030) on a scale of [–10, 10], see column 6. 
This indirect effect of rainfall-driven floods on democracy is significant at the 1% level.  
With regard to the direct effects of rainfall-driven floods on democracy, our estimates in 
Equation III of Model 3.2 indicate that flood severity had no impact on the Polity2 score (column 
6). However, this result must be interpreted with caution because it does not account for year fixed 
effects and country-specific time trends.  
In this manner, we arrive at our preferred specification, which is provided in Model 3.3. 
After entirely isolating permanent country characteristics, common time effects, and country-
specific time trends, we believe that any remaining variation in Model 3.3 is reasonably exogenous 
to outcome variables. Specifically, Model 3.3 indicates that excessive rainfall has a significant 
impact on flood severity (Equation I, column 7), which, in turn, has two significant and opposite 
effects on the Polity2 measure of democracy. The indirect effect suggests that one in every 100 
                                                 
14 Our sample indicates that 25 percent of flooding events around the world during the 1979–2009 period affected at 
least one percent of the country’s population or more. 
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people affected by floods increases the PRS measure of corruption by 0.175 points on a scale of 0 
to 6, which is significant at the 5% level (Equation II, column 8). This estimate supports the first 
component of Hypothesis 1 on the increased likelihood of corruption following floods. We also 
estimate that increased corruption is associated with a higher 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score of 0.86 points (0.175 
× 4.891) on a scale of [–10, 10], an effect that is significant at the 1% level (Equation III, column 
9). This important evidence sheds significant light on the second component of Hypothesis 1 
regarding what was a priori an ambiguous relationship between flood-induced corruption and 
democracy.  
On the other hand, rainfall-driven floods have a direct and negative effect on democracy. 
Our estimates of Equation III in column 9 indicate that one in every 100 people affected by floods 
is associated with a 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 score that is 0.65 points lower, an effect that is significant at the 10% 
level. This evidence is consistent with the ‘repression effect,’ whereby the chaos stemming from 
violence, dissent, misappropriation and plunder following a natural disaster induces the political 
regime to resort to a nondemocratic response. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2 set forth 
above. In sum, the net effect of rainfall-driven floods in the presence of corruption is that one in 
every 100 people affected by floods in a given year leads to an improvement of 0.21 points (i.e., 
0.86–0.65) in the Polity2 measure of democracy. Given that the indirect effects are statistically 
superior, it seems safe to conclude that there is a net positive change in Polity2 scores following 
extreme rainfall-driven floods. 
5.2. Temporal Effects of Extreme Rainfall-Driven Floods on Democracy 
Our estimates in Model 3.3 capture the contemporaneous response of democracy to 
extreme rainfall-driven floods. However, there might be lagged relationships with respect to both 
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the direct and indirect effects. For example, citizens may not have an immediate option with regard 
to overthrowing the incumbent government (e.g., national elections may not be near). In addition, 
the government may impose repressive restrictions upon citizens for a longer time horizon to 
sustain itself in power. To determine whether there are in fact such temporal effects, we replace 
all variables in our preferred Model 3.3 with their associated lags of one-year (Model 4.1), two-
years (Model 4.2), three-years (Model 4.3), and four-years (Model 4.4), except that we retain our 
main outcome variable Polity2 at time t. Notably, in Models 4.1 to 4.4, our shifters (i.e., extreme 
rain, neighboring countries’ average GDP and neighboring countries’ average Polity2) turn out to 
be statistically significant at the 10% level, at least.  
The lagged effects of the corruption channel are striking. The empirical estimates suggest 
that higher corruption due to extreme rainfall-driven floods is associated with more democracy in 
the next three consecutive years, at the 1% level of significance for the first two years and slightly 
beyond the 10% level of significance for the third year (Columns 3, 6 and 9). Importantly, the 
effect diminishes over time and disappears entirely after the fourth year (Column 12). The fading 
corruption effect on democracy implies that relief-related corruption is short-lived probably 
because the chance of expropriating relief is exhausted once the disaster-driven resource windfall 
is closed. This type of effect contrasts with the corruption effect that is longer lived, which is 
typically driven by rent-seeking activities within the state or government. A second reason for 
short-lived relief-related corruption might be that whereas such corruption is likely to involve a 
single party (e.g., government), rent-seeking activities typically involve multiple parties, including 
members of the public, which at bottom means greater enthusiasm for benefits. Overall, our result 
uncovers a new finding in this line of research that if flood relief-related expropriations are 
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observed by citizens, they may demand polity reform over many years (rather than only 
contemporaneously), but this demand is relatively short-lived, as is the resource windfall and the 
consequent expropriation that ensues.15  
In terms of lagged direct effects, these effects seem to prevail over the two years following 
the flooding (Columns 6 and 9) at the 10% level of significance. One explanation for this result is 
that the government may take flood-driven chaos as an opportunity to become non-democratic and 
to lengthen its incumbency; however, we do not read much into this evidence owing to its weaker 
statistical significance. 
5.3. The Validity of the Exclusion Restrictions 
As discussed in Section 4, the validity of the exclusion restriction is critical within our system 
context, i.e., extreme rainfall should have no systematic effects on country’s level of corruption 
beyond the effect that it exerts on flood severity. Notwithstanding our very restrictive specification, 
one may argue that the exclusion restrictions might be violated if atmospheric conditions—such 
as trajectories of rainfall massed over a country—follow a similar trend in adjacent countries. In 
this case, a given rainfall incident may trigger similar mechanisms in adjacent countries, making 
it difficult to argue that the shock is unique to the country in question. A counter to this argument 
is that it is difficult for monthly rainfall incidents over a 30-year time period to form a consistent 
pattern of extreme rainfall catastrophes shared by neighboring countries to challenge the 
estimation. Nevertheless, we undertake a formal step to address this issue by controlling for 
neighbors’ extreme rainfall (as weighted by neighbors’ populations). If neighbors’ extreme rainfall 
                                                 
15 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for having revealed to us the lag effects in the timing of variables 
and their potential implications. 
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affects a country’s income and democracy over and above its own incidents, then our exclusion 
restrictions may be violated. Nonetheless, Table 5 show neighbors’ extreme rainfall to be 
insignificant in all our models.  
Another concern is that the income of neighboring countries (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑌) may 
influence 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦2 in Equation III through channels other than the country’s own income. These 
mechanisms typically involve time-variant channels, and the main suspect in this case is trade and 
other bilateral links. We check whether trade with neighbors, which we measure as a spurt in trade 
with bordering countries, is associated with a similar spurt in the income and democracy of a 
country by including the share of neighbors in overall trade in Equations II and III, but any such 
association does not affect the results (unreported). Further, we control for whether a country is a 
member of a trading bloc, such as the European Union, Commonwealth of Independent States, 
North American Free Trade Agreement, Association of South East Asian Nations, or Gulf 
Cooperation Council. We find that such membership does not suggest a channel of concern for 
identification purposes (unreported). 
Overall, these checks do not support the notion that neighbors affect a country through 
other channels in our context. Although all time-variant factors for both democracy and income 
cannot be conclusively excluded, our restrictive empirical design seems to eliminate significant 
indirect correlations that might otherwise jeopardize identification of the system. 
6. Flood, Corruption and Democracy: A Simple Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model 
What are the possible dynamics between flood-induced corruption and democratic 
improvement? We provide insights into this question with a simple dynamic game-theoretic 
model. Although there may be other explanations for the corruption-democracy nexus arising after 
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floods, this model provides a novel insight into the link between governmental choice and citizens’ 
reactions following a natural disaster. 
The game is played by a government and voters following a natural disaster in three stages. 
See Figure 2. We use the following notation: 𝑦 = per capita income; 𝑟 = per capita cost of rain 
damage; 𝜋 = the incumbent government’s payoff from re-election; 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 = per capita relief and 
rehabilitation after rain damage; cc = governmental cost of preventing corruption; cd = 
governmental cost of maintaining democracy; ci = governmental cost of neutralizing the violent 
reaction that results from corrupt relief disbursement; 𝑑𝑒𝑚 = voter benefit from having 
democracy; and 𝑎𝑢𝑡 = voter cost of enduring autocracy.  
6.1. Basic Setup  
In the first stage of the game, the government decides whether and what moves to make knowing 
the rain damage, r. If no action is undertaken to remedy the rain damage, each voter’s payoff is y 
– r, where y is standard per capita income. In the aftermath of flooding, there are ex-ante disaster-
preparedness aids and ex-post international relief and rehabilitation to be allocated to the citizens, 
denoted as relief. However, these aids are subject to possible expropriation by 
officials/bureaucrats. In light of such corruption, relief will be ineffective. However, if the 
government intends to prevent corruption, it must incur a cost, cc, to prevent relief from being 
misappropriated. The government will choose between allowing corruption versus preventing 
corruption depending on (1) the corruption-prevention cost, cc,; (2) possible reactions of the voters 
in stage two regarding whether or not to re-elect the incumbent government after observing the 
government’s actions with respect to corruption during the first stage; and (3) the government’s 
further move in the third and final stage regarding its choice between authoritarianism vs. 
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democracy, i.e., if it is re-elected during the second stage. Therefore, both government and voter 
decisions and actions at each stage are common knowledge. 
 During the second stage, voters will decide whether to keep the current government in 
power or to vote it out in favor of a new government. The incumbent government will derive a 
payoff from staying in power if re-elected, denoted by 𝜋, and zero payoff from being voted-out. 
We assume that a new and unknown government can only provide voters with a base level of 
expected utility, 0, beyond their status-quo payoffs. The voters’ decision in stage two will depend 
on (i) whether the government has allowed corruption or not at stage one (i.e., whether relief was 
misappropriated or channeled to the voters) and (ii) the incumbent government’s best interest at 
stage three in terms of choosing democracy vs. authoritarianism, if it is re-elected. 
 The incumbent government will make no further decisions if voted out at stage two. It will 
reach stage three only if it is re-elected, in which case it will incur a cost, cd, if it chooses to 
maintain democracy because democratic decision making and implementing democratically made 
decisions is costly compared to the arbitrary decision making and implementation that 
characterizes autocracy. Voters obtain a positive payoff of dem if the government remains 
democratic, and a negative payoff of aut if it becomes autocratic. Further, if the incumbent 
government’s authoritarianism allows corruption, the public will show its discontent through 
disobedience, which will be costly for the government to neutralize. To quell such insubordination, 
the government will face a cost of ci. We assume that ci is higher than both cd and cc, but we make 
no assumption as to whether cd or cc is larger. 
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6.2. Analysis 
The analysis of such a dynamic game is conducted through “backward induction,” which begins 
with the decision of the government at stage three. For simplicity, the game can analytically consist 
of two subgames, the left-hand (LH) subgame comprising all decision nodes following the 
government’s choice of “corruption” and the right-hand (RH) subgame comprising all decision 
nodes after the government’s choice of “no corruption” at stage one.  
a. Stage Three 
At this stage, the government will select as follows between the actions “democracy” and 
“autocracy”: 
 “Democracy” at its LH decision node since the payoff for “democracy” exceeds that of 
“autocracy,” i.e., π – cd > π – ci and 
 “Autocracy” at its RH decision node since the payoff for “autocracy” exceeds that of 
“democracy,” i.e., π – cc > π – cc – cd. 
b. Stage Two  
Fully predicting the above-mentioned decisions of the government at stage three, in the LH 
subgame, voters will compare the payoff y – r from “voting the government out” to the payoff y – 
r + dem from “re-electing” it. In the RH subgame, voters will compare the payoff y – r + relief 
from “voting out” the government to the payoff y – r + relief – aut from “re-electing” it. Thus, 
given the government’s choices of “democracy” at its LH decision node and “autocracy” at its RH 
decision node at stage three, at stage two, the voters will select as follows: 
 To “re-elect” at its LH decision node since the payoff for “re-elect” exceeds that of “vote 
out,” i.e., y – r + dem > y – r 
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 To “vote out” at its RH decision node since the payoff for “vote out” exceeds that of “re-
elect,” i.e., y – r + relief > y – r + relief – aut 
c. Stage One 
At this stage, the government will decide whether (or not) to prevent corruption, given that two 
choices will lie ahead: pick the LH subgame (i.e., allow corruption), for which the payoff will be 
𝜋 − dc , or pick the RH subgame (i.e., prevent corruption), for which the payoff will be 0 – cc. 
Thus, given the LH subgame’s outcome, i.e., given voters’ choice to “re-elect” at its LH decision 
node of stage two and the government’s own choice of “democracy” at its LH decision node at 
stage three, and given the RH subgame’s outcome, i.e., given the voters’ choice to “vote out” at its 
RH decision node of stage two and the government’s own choice of “autocracy” at its RH decision 
at stage three, 
at stage one, between the actions “corruption” vs. “no corruption,” the government will select 
 “Corruption” since the payoff for “corruption” exceeds that of “no corruption,” i.e., π – cd 
> 0 – cc. 
To summarize the equilibrium, the government allows corruption after the flood; the voters re-
elect the incumbent government, predicting that it will choose to rule democratically after re-
election; and the re-elected incumbent government will indeed be democratic.16 
 Several anecdotes around the world are consistent with this game, although political 
players might have followed different branches of the game tree. In reality, governments or citizens 
                                                 
16 The off-equilibrium prediction of the model is that rampant corruption in the flood year is followed by less 
democracy in the subsequent year, but then the regime faces an insurgency. The model also implies that preventing 
corruption after flooding events can go hand in hand with autocracy off-the-equilbrium. 
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may not have perfect and/or complete information—which is different than in our model—and 
they may thus miscalculate. However, two cases are highly informative to put the game in 
perspective: Turkey in the wake of the 1999 earthquake and Brazil after enacting its anti-corruption 
program in 2003. The Turkish case is characterized by the left-most branch of game tree in which 
the three-party coalition government chose the corruption option in the aftermath the 1999 
earthquake and was in turn voted out. The government had proven ineffective not only at 
preventing the misappropriated of disaster aid but also at chasing those who built the vulnerable 
structures.17 The electorate voted out all three parties from parliament in 2002. Notably, the new 
government introduced revolutionary building and insurance codes and (importantly) offered more 
democracy within a few years after being elected. In the Brazilian case, the government 
promulgated an autonomous anti-corruption program in 2003 in an attempt to increase political 
transparency and to improve the disbursement of public transfers. Brollo (2012) shows that the 
program, which was set up to randomly audit local governments in terms of their public 
expenditures and lowers federal infrastructure allocations if corrupt activity is found, reduces the 
probability that corrupt local politicians will be re-elected. This achievement of decimating local-
level corruption enabled the federal government to remain authoritarian, a prediction that is 
consistent with the right-most off-equilibrium branch of our game tree. 
7. Conclusions 
It has been predicted that the frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall incidents will increase by 
the end of the 21st century in several regions around the globe. A 1-in-20 year annual maximum 
                                                 
17 Of more than 2,100 court cases opened to investigate the death of 17,280 people, the judiciary was able to punish 
only one contractor, Veli Göçer, who was sentenced to 7.5 years (for a total of 195 deaths in the sites he built) and 
became a public name. Hundreds of other contractors escaped punishment. 
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daily precipitation amount is likely to become a 1-in-5 to a 1-in-15 year event, particularly for high 
latitudes and tropical regions in the northern mid-latitudes during winter. Thus, extreme rainfall-
driven flooding events, which are already formidable threats for both developing and developed 
countries, are likely to further challenge incumbent regimes by driving certain demands on the part 
of the citizenry if their governing structures include weak disaster management institutions.  
Using a new measure of extreme rainfall covering a sample of 130 countries over the 1979–
2009 period, our analysis strongly indicates that extreme rainfall-driven flood incidents result in 
two significant but opposing effects on democracy through the corruption channel. On one hand, 
extreme rainfall-driven floods increase corruption in the post-disaster emergency response and 
recovery efforts, which, in turn, leads people to demand more democracy. On the other hand, the 
extreme rainfall-driven flood incidents are associated with a ‘repression’ effect, which is likely to 
be induced by the chaos in the aftermath of the disaster, forcing government to resort to non-
democratic behavior. Taken together, our key result is that the net effect of rainfall-driven floods 
is more democracy through the corruption mechanism. Moreover, we show that flood-induced 
corruption in a given year has significant effects on democracy for the next three years but that the 
effect dies out after the fourth year. 
 Next, we unpack the indirect effect, i.e., the relationship between flood-induced corruption 
and improvements in democracy by means of a game theoretic model. The game is played between 
the government and voters in three stages following a natural disaster, and the model sheds light 
on the dynamics related to the government’s choice of whether to tackle corruption during the 
distribution of relief and emergency response and the voters’ subsequent reaction to the 
government’s choice. The model equilibrium suggests that it is costly for the government both to 
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prevent corrupt conduct in the distribution of relief and to maintain democracy following the 
disaster. However, it is even costlier to allow corruption during the relief phase as well as to 
become autocratic following the disaster, given the insurgency threat that this doubly opportunistic 
stance would induce from the public. The model’s equilibrium predicts a second-best outcome for 
both the government and voters: the government allows corruption to occur in emergency relief 
and response but improves democratic conditions following its re-election. This prediction rests 
on a heuristic observation that a regime is unlikely to pursue a response trajectory that involves 
either a double-negative (i.e., not preventing corruption and becoming autocratic) or a zero-
negative (i.e., preventing corruption and becoming democratic) following a disaster. The more 
likely response is that which involves only one negative in which the negative is associated with 
lower cost to the government. 
Overall, this study traces two different components of political change that occur in the 
aftermath of flooding events: a direct effect leading to an increased autocratic tendency in the 
incumbent regime, which we interpret to be due to a repressive response by the government in 
disaster management and an indirect effect through increased corruption that results in more 
democracy following the government’s re-election. Our finding that the repression-led autocratic 
tendency is empirically dominated by corruption-induced democratic improvement suggests that 
citizens may be willing to accept autocratic tendencies in the regime for purposes of efficient relief 
distribution and/or protection of property rights during a disaster but that a larger subset of the 
population would be dissatisfied (and possibly insurgent) if there is corruption during the 
distribution of relief. Governments can overcome this challenge by offering to be more democratic. 
31 
 
 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2001). 'A theory of political transitions', American Economic 
Review, vol. 91(4), pp. 938–963. 
Ades, A. and H. B. Chua (1997). 'Thy neighbor's curse: Regional instability and economic growth', 
Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 2(3), pp. 279–304. 
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1999). 'Rents, competition, and corruption', American Economic Review, 
vol. 89(4), pp. 982-993. 
Akarca, A.T. and A. Tansel (2016). 'Voter reaction to government incompetence and corruption 
related to the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey', Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 43(2), pp. 
309-335. 
Beardsley, K. & McQuinn, B. (2009). Rebel Groups as Predatory Organizations: The Political 
Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 53(4), 624-645. 
Brollo, F. (2012). 'Why Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-
corruption Program', Working paper No. 336, Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic 
Research (IGIER). 
Brückner, M. and A. Ciccone (2011). 'Rain and the democratic window of opportunity', 
Econometrica, vol. 79(3), pp. 923–947. 
Chang C.P. and Berdiev A.N. (2015). ‘Do natural disasters increase the likelihood that a 
government is replaced?’ Applied Economics, vol. 47(17), pp. 1788–1808. 
Cole, S., A. Healy and E. Werker (2012). 'Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence 
from Indian disaster relief', Journal of Development Economics, vol. 97(2), pp. 167–181. 
Conley, T. G. and E. Ligon (2002). 'Economic distance and cross-country spillovers', Journal of 
Economic Growth, vol. 7(2), pp. 157–187. 
CRED (2011). 'EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, v. 12.07', Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, viewed 27 December 2012, http://www.emdat.be 
Cunderlik, J. M. and D. H. Burn (2002). 'Analysis of the linkage between rain and flood regime 
and its application to regional flood frequency estimation', Journal of Hydrology, vol. 
261(1), pp. 115–131. 
Dell, M., B. F. Jones and B. A. Olken (2014). 'What do we learn from the weather? The new 
climate-economy literature', Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 52(3), pp. 740-798. 
Escaleras, M., Anbarci, N. and Register, C.A. (2007) ‘Public sector corruption and major 
earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction’, Public Choice, pp. 132: 209.  
Escaleras M. and Register C. A. (2012). ‘Fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks.’ Public 
Choice, vol. 151(1-2), pp. 165–183. 
Field, C. B. (Ed.). (2012). Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate 
change adaptation. Cambridge University Press. 
Heston, A., R. Summers and B. Aten (2011). 'Penn World Table Version 7.0', Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices, University of Pennsylvania. 
Hunt, J. (2007). 'How corruption hits people when they are down', Journal of Development 
Economics, vol. 84(2), pp. 574-589. 
Kahn, M. E. (2005). 'The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography, and 
Institutions', Review of Economics & Statistics, vol. 87(2), pp. 271-284. 
32 
 
 
 
Keefer, P., Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2011). 'Earthquake propensity and the politics of 
mortality prevention', World Development, vol. 39(9), pp. 1530–41. 
Leeson, P. T. and A. M. Dean (2009). 'The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical 
Investigation', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53(3), pp. 533-551. 
Leeson, P. T. and R. S. Sobel (2007). 'The Impact of FEMA on US Corruption: Implications for 
Policy', Mercatus Policy Comment No. 8, Mercatus Policy Series, Global Prosperity 
Initiative, Mercatus Centre, George Mason University. 
Leeson, P. T. and R. S. Sobel (2008). 'Weathering corruption', Journal of Law and Economics, 
vol. 51(4), pp. 667-681. 
Leeson P.T. and Sobel R.S. (2011). ‘Race, politics, and punishment.’ European Journal of Law 
and Economics, vol. 31(3), pp. 265–285. 
Marshall, M. and K. Jaggers (2005). 'Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual', Center for Global 
Policy, George Mason University. 
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath and E. Sergenti (2004). 'Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An 
Instrumental Variables Approach', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112(4), pp. 725-753. 
Noy, I. (2009). 'The macroeconomic consequences of disasters', Journal of Development 
Economics, vol. 88(2), pp. 221-231. 
Nunn, N. and D. Puga (2012). 'Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa', The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 94(1), pp. 20–36. 
Peters, J.G. and S. Welch (1980). 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behavior in 
congressional elections', American Political Science Review, vol. 74(03), pp. 697-708. 
Welch, S. and J.R. Hibbing (1997). 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behavior in 
congressional elections, 1982–1990', The Journal of Politics, vol. 59(01), pp. 226-239. 
PRS-ICRG (2007). 'International Country Risk Guide', The PRS Group. 
Schultz A. and Libman A. (2015). ‘Is there a local knowledge advantage in federations? Evidence 
from a natural experiment.’ Public Choice, vol. 162(1), pp. 25–42. 
Seligson, M. A. (2006). 'The measurement and impact of corruption victimization: Survey 
evidence from Latin America', World Development, vol. 34(2), pp. 381-404. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1993). 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108(3), pp. 
599–617. 
Sobel R. S. and Leeson P.T. (2006). ‘Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice 
analysis.’ Public Choice, vol. 127(1-2), pp. 55–73. 
Starr, H. (1991). 'Democratic Dominoes', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35(2), pp. 356-381. 
Starr, H. and C. Lindborg (2003). 'Democratic dominoes revisited', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 47(4), pp. 490-519. 
Sui, J. and Koehler, G. (2001). 'Rain-on-snow induced flood events in Southern Germany', Journal 
of Hydrology, vol. 252(1), pp. 205–20. 
Welch, S. and J.R. Hibbing (1997). 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behavior in 
congressional elections, 1982–1990', The Journal of Politics, vol. 59(01), pp. 226-239. 
Wood, R.M., and T.M. Wright (2015). ‘Responding to catastrophe. Repression dynamics 
following rapid-onset natural disasters’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.  
Yamamura E. (2014). ‘Impact of natural disaster on public sector corruption.’ Public Choice, vol. 
161(3-4), pp. 385–405. 
 
33 
 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of the Extreme Rainfall Calculation 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics* 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations 
    
Log extreme rainfall 4.746 2.159 4,031 
Total affected by floods in every 100 people 0.621 4.581 6,773 
Log neighboring nations’ average GDP 26.172 1.763 4,538 
Average of neighbors’ Polity2 1.693 6.534 4,515 
PRS corruption index 3.099 1.387 2,942 
Polity2 1.170 7.346 4,354 
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Table 2: Extreme Rainfall, Corruption and Democracy: Single-Equation Estimation 
Model Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 Polity2 PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
 LS LS LS LS IV-LIML IV-LIML IV-LIML LS LS IV-LIML 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A:           
Log Extreme Rainfall 0.003 -0.0002 0.0003     0.006   
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)     (0.007)   
No. of Flood-Affected Persons    0.008 0.016 -0.001 0.002  0.002 0.053 
     in Every 100 People    (0.015) (0.150) (0.149) (0.148)  (0.002) (0.068) 
Log Y  -0.272 1.815   -0.273 1.818    
  (0.877) (4.349)   (0.872) (4.339)    
Log Y2   -0.140    -0.141    
        (0.285)    (0.285)    
           
Panel B: First Stage for No. of Flood-Affected Persons in Every 100 People 
  
Log Extreme Rainfall     0.203 0.205 0.205   0.100 
        (0.080)** (0.080)** (0.080)**   (0.062) 
Log Y      -0.470 -1.838    
      (0.423) (2.143)    
Log Y2       0.092    
       (0.140)    
           
Kleiberg-Paap F-Statistic     6.49 6.55 6.52   2.66 
           
Observations 3,315 3,272 3,272 3,315 3,315 3,272 3,272 2,268 2,268 2,268 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. LIML: Fuller limited information maximum likelihood. Y: Real GDP Per Capita. All 
equations include country fixed effects, country time trends and common time effects. *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; and ***significant 
at 1% level. 
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Table 3: Extreme Rainfall, Corruption and Democracy: System Estimation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES No. of 
Flood-
Affected in 
Every 100 
People 
PRS Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 No. of Flood-
Affected 
Persons in 
Every 100 
People 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 No. of Flood-
Affected Persons 
in Every 100 
People 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 
Log Extreme Rainfall -0.022   0.098   0.065   
  (0.015)   (0.040)**   (0.038)*   
Log Y 2.222   -6.523   -5.575   
 (0.261)***   (1.441)***   (2.241)**   
Log Y2 -0.159   0.420   0.281   
      (0.016)***   (0.089)***   (0.154)*   
No. of Flood-Affected Persons in   1.189 3.236  0.185 -0.369  0.175 -0.649 
 Every 100 People  (0.073)*** (0.251)***  (0.097)* (0.430)  (0.089)** (0.392)* 
Log Neighbors’ Average GDP  -0.067   0.799   -0.206  
   (0.024)***   (0.050)***   (0.083)**  
Neighbors’ Average Polity2   0.440   0.448   0.129 
   (0.025)***   (0.030)***   (0.032)*** 
PRS Corruption Index   -4.982   3.030   4.891 
   (0.266)***   (0.325)***   (0.875)*** 
          
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 2,268 
See the notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4: Temporal Effects of Extreme Rainfall-Driven Floods, Corruption and Democracy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES No. of 
Flood-
Affected 
Persons in 
Every 100 
People, t-1 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index, t-1 
Polity2, t No. of Flood-
Affected 
Persons in 
Every 100 
People, t-2 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index, t-2 
Polity2, t No. of Flood-
Affected 
Persons in 
Every 100 
People, t-3 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index, t-3 
Polity2, t No. of Flood-
Affected 
Persons in 
Every 100 
People, t-4 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index, t-4 
Polity2, t 
 Model 4.1: All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year 
Model 4.2: All explanatory variables are 
lagged by two years 
Model 4.3: All explanatory variables are 
lagged by three years 
Model 4.4: All explanatory variables 
are lagged by four years 
Log Extreme Rainfall 0.0664   0.0665   0.0654   0.0644   
  (0.0379)*   (0.0377)*   (0.0375)*   (0.0396)   
Log Y -5.794   -6.402   -6.318   -6.458   
 (2.263)**   (2.290)***   (2.263)***   (2.326)***   
Log Y2 0.301   0.344   0.335   0.338   
      (0.156)*   (0.157)**   (0.154)**   (0.159)**   
No. of Flood-Affected Persons   0.178 -0.440  0.169 -0.643  0.161 -0.584  0.173 -0.403 
 in Every 100 People  (0.0884)** (0.342)  (0.0868)* (0.337)*  (0.0866)* (0.322)*  (0.0896)* (0.289) 
Log Neighbors’ Average GDP  -0.232   -0.200   -0.176   -0.179  
   (0.0896)***   (0.0929)**   (0.0960)*   (0.0997)*  
Neighbors’ Average Polity2   0.107   0.0954   0.0828   0.0568 
   (0.0312)***   (0.0305)***   (0.0297)***   (0.0284)** 
PRS Corruption Index   3.254   2.884   1.277   -0.00632 
   (0.834)***   (0.818)***   (0.821)   (0.766) 
             
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,266 2,266 2,266 2,265 2,265 2,265 2,157 2,157 2,157 
 See the notes to Table 2.  
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Table 5. Neighbors’ Extreme Rainfall: Checking the Exclusion Restriction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES No. of Flood-
Affected Persons in 
Every 100 People 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 No. of Flood-
Affected Persons in 
Every 100 People 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 No. of Flood-
Affected Persons in 
Every 100 People 
PRS 
Corruption 
Index 
Polity2 
 
4.1: Sample with available neighbors’ 
extreme rainfall data 
4.2: Neighbours’ extreme rainfall weighted by 
population 
4.3: Neighbours’ extreme rainfall weighted 
by GDP 
Log Extreme Rainfall 0.110   0.090   0.093   
  (0.039)*** 
  
(0.042)** 
  
(0.041)** 
  
Log Y -6.250   -6.053   -6.220   
 
(2.457)** 
  
(2.286)*** 
  
(2.267)*** 
  
Log Y2 0.356   0.332   0.344   
 
(0.170)** 
  
(0.157)** 
  
(0.156)** 
  
No. of Flood-Affected Persons  0.129 -0.631  0.165 -0.447  0.165 -0.541 
 in Every 100 people 
 
(0.066)** (0.344)* 
 
(0.083)** (0.392) 
 
(0.082)** (0.394) 
Log Neighbors’ Average GDP  -0.149   -0.155   -0.133  
  
(0.078)* 
  
(0.080)* 
  
(0.079)* 
 
PRS Corruption Index   5.722   4.966   5.081 
   
(0.850)*** 
  
(0.879)*** 
  
(0.888)*** 
Neighbors’ Average Polity2   0.191   0.190   0.188 
   
(0.036)*** 
  
(0.036)*** 
  
(0.035)*** 
Log Neighbors’ Extreme    0.083 -1.021 -0.078    
 Rainfall Weighted by Population 
   
(0.080) (2.023) (0.106) 
   
Log Neighbors’ Extreme        0.072 -1.024 -0.015 
 Rainfall Weighted by GDP       (0.073) (2.021) (0.098) 
          
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 1,973 
See the notes to Table 2.  
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Figure 2: A Simple Theoretical Model 
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